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Heidegger’s remark that the banks of the river (representing nature in its supposedly pure 
state) only become apparent because of the presence of the bridge (representing the 
artificial in its supposed opposition to that nature)
1 will lead this presentation to a 
discussion of whether or not the idea of “nature” as prior to architecture remains 
unequivocally valid.  If nature/the site - that which claims
2 to come before the 
artificial/architecture -  only appears as a result of the presence of the 
artifice/architecture, then the notion of nature/the site as original
3 and prior to 
artifice/architecture is called into question. 
 
That question will in turn stimulate a particular thinking about place as the relationship, 
resonance, or play
4, between a number of sets of poles, including nature/architecture 
and building/subject
5.  Thus a relational interpretation will be given to architecture and 
place.  This interpretation will be informed, via Derrida’s exposition
6, by references to 
chora (place) in Plato’s Timaeus, recalling in turn that the word relates to non-static 
notions of place: to the chorus, the dance. 
 
The photographic work of Andras Gursky and Thomas Ruff, amongst others, may be 
used during the presentation. 
 
1 Heidegger, Martin. “Building Dwelling Thinking” in Poetry, Language, Thought, ed 
Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 1971; p152.  In the same collection, the 
section on the Greek Temple in “The Origin of the Work of Art” makes a similar point 
2 see the introductory pages to Laugier, Marc-Antoine An Essay on Architecture (trans of 
Essai sur l’architecture, 1753). Los Angeles: Hennersey & Ingalls, 1977 
3 cf Derrida, Jacques. “Qual Quelles: Valery’s Sources” in Margins of Philosophy trans 
Alan Bass. Chicago: UCP, 1982 
4 cf chapter 9 “Play: from the Phamakon to the Letter & from Blindness to the 
Supplement” in “Plato’s Pharmacy” in Dissemination trans Barbara Johnson. Chicago: 
CUP, 1981 
5 cf Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth & Method. London: Sheed & Ward, 1975, pp 91-142 
esp pp138-142 on architecture;  Lindsey Jones, in The Hermeneutics of Sacred 
Architecture (Cambridge, Mass: HUP, 2000) has re-emphasised Gadamer’s take on 
architecture, although from a specifically ritual perspective which this author would 
question 
6 in Derrida, Jacques “Chora” in Chora L Works, ed J Kipnis & T Lesser.  New York: 
Monacelli Press, 1997    
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So, to begin with nature.  There it is, unspoilt, pristine, a site, a location from which 





It is simple – an origin, there, out there, prior to us, prior to our activities, prior to 
architecture, prior to all conceptualisation, all metaphoricality [metaphor; the taking 
over of a “natural” meaning by an artificial one]; in short, prior to all artificiality. 
 
Laugier, perhaps clearest of all (but his fabricated myth is repeated more or less 
explicitly across the history of writings on architecture) knew it to be so.  His essay 
hopes to essay and establish the “principles of architecture”; beyond the “chaotic 
mess of clumsy debris, immense piles of shapeless materials, a dreadful noise of 
hammers, perilous scaffolding, a fearful grinding of machines and an army of dirty 
and mud covered workmen” (a sort of primordial chaos from which the building 
arises) there is an essence accessible to those with a clear eye, for “it is the same in 
architecture as in all other arts; its principles are founded on simple nature…”  And 
here comes the myth, fabricated (inevitably – for who could have recorded such a 
moment?) by Laugier: 
 
let us look at man in his primitive state without any aid or guidance other than his 
natural instincts.  He is in need of a place to rest.  On the banks of a quietly 
flowing brook he notices a stretch of grass; its fresh  greenness is pleasing to his 
eyes… he thinks of nothing else but enjoying the gift of nature;…. but soon the 
scorching heat of the sun forces him to look for shelter.   A nearby forest draws 
him to its cooling shade…. there he is content.  But suddenly… torrential rain 
pours down on this delightful forest.  The savage… creeps into a nearby cave 
and, finding it dry, he praises himself for his discovery.  But soon the darkness 
and foul air surrounding him make his stay unbearable again.  He leaves and is 
resolved to make good by his ingenuity the careless neglect of nature.  He wants 
to make himself a dwelling that protects but does not bury him.  Some fallen 
branches in the forest are the right material for his purpose; he chooses four of 
the strongest, raises them upright and arranges them in a square; across their top 
he lays four other branches; on these he hoists from two sides yet another row of 
branches which, inclining towards each other, meet at their highest point. He 
then covers this kind of roof with leaves so closely packed that neither sun nor 
rain can penetrate.  Thus, man is housed…. 
 
Such is the course of simple nature; by imitating the natural process, art was 
born.   All the splendours of architecture ever conceived have been modelled on 
the little rustic hut I have just described…. Let us never loose sight of our little 
rustic hut. 
 
As is well know, we can find the same myth, more or less explicitly put, with 
variations (does fire bring communities together first, or buildings?) in Vitruvius, 




Gursky’s piece might be thought to illustrate unequivocally the natural pole of this 
myth.  A mountain, raw nature, edging towards the sublime; the elements coming 
fierce off it; that against which architecture defines itself. 
 
This work is, of course, anything but a representation of nature.  This is no 
mountain; nature is not there.  There is here a series of more or less apparent 
mediations; this is a projection of a slide, made from a photograph of a plate in a 
book which represents a piece of work – a c-print or a series of c-prints – which is in 
turn a presentation of a form of digitally and optically manipulated photograph of a    page 2 
mountain.  It is run through and through with artificiality and a series of conceptual 
manoeuvres, moves away from any “raw” nature. 
 
So much is clear. 
 
But more radically, we should ask, was the mountain – standing here for nature in 
its “pure” state – ever “there” for Gursky beforehand.  Before the work, or least 




Here is a bridge.  Baldessari’s “Man and woman with Bridge”.  It’s like Heidegger’s 
bridge, perhaps the old one across the river in Heidelberg.  In Building Dwelling 
Thinking he asks the question “what is a built thing?”; and gives the example of a 
bridge in immediate response. 
 
The bridge swings over the stream with ease and power.  It does not just connect 
banks that are already there.  The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge 
crosses the stream.  The bridge designedly causes them to lie across from each 




The banks of the river here stand for nature in its pure state, that which for Laugier 
would so clearly pre-exist the bridge, which in response to nature is the artificial 
work of architecture which is brought to impinge itself (more or less beneficially) 
onto nature.  But, for Heidegger, the banks do not pre-exist the bridge.  Neither does 
the river.  The banks and the river emerge as they are, as “nature”, only as – that is, 
at the same time as, [zugleich] – the bridge.  Nature does not, for Heidegger, come 
before the artificial.  It is as if the “natural”, far from pre-existing architecture or the 
artificial, only occurs, can only come to exist, by virtue of architecture or the 
artificial.  The “usual” order is inverted, conceptually certainly, temporally as well. 
 
Likewise, in The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger speaks of a Greek temple 
simply standing in its rock-cleft valley, but in its standing it “holds its ground against 
the storm raging about it and so first makes the storm manifest in its violence…. 
men and animals, plants and things, are never present and familiar as unchangeable 
objects, only to represent incidentally also a fitting environment for the temple, 
which one day is added to what is, rather, if we think of all this in reverse order…”.  
The “natural” – the storm, plants and animals, the rock-clef valley itself – can only 
appear as such when “added” to it, in an addition that is no addition because the 
“nature” which was supposed to have pre-existing only arrives at the same time as 
and by virtue of the artificial. 
 
So it is with Gursky’s Rhein.  Gursky is “showing” us the riverness of the great river; 
but he does this by means firstly of that most artificial of image-making, the camera.  
Secondly, by means of digital manipulation, he further distances from us what was 
already “there”, but at once brings us closer as well, bringing us the “pure” river, the 
“pure” banks, unsullied by extraneous forms.  In other words, to reveal the “river” 
and its banks in their pristine state, he goes to an extreme of artificiality, mediating 
the supposed “thing itself” through a series of manipulations which would finally 
allow us to see, truly and in essence, what was putatively there originally.  And by 
doing this he points to the structural necessity that in order for there to be 
“riverness”, the “essence” of the river; and in order for there to be the “river” itself, 
natural, in an original state prior to the image of it; the possibility of the image (the 
possibility of that which we deem to come after the original) must already be there.  
No prior nature without a prior artificiality, which thus destroys all assurances of the 





Photographic work can play this game in other directions.  Ricola Laufen, by Ruff, is 
not a straightforward documentary photograph of a Herzog and de Meuron building.  
That building in itself is already playing a very subtle game about the ordinary the 
mundane, that which appears as though it has always been there but which on 
closer or further inspection starts to question the polarities of ordinariness and pre-
existence as against the special and irruptive.  This work is not a Becher portrait of 
an existing ordinary building.  Not that the Bechers’ work is this, either.  But Ruff’s  Bechers’ 
water tower 
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work here all the more not.  Ruff sent out a local, jobbing photographer to the Ricola 
building with a set of instructions to photograph the building head-on.  A series of 
shots were to be taken of the long façade, because it is in fact impossible to stand 
back from this building in order to take a full-frontal shot.  Ruff then pieced together 
these shots, taken by an anonymous image-worker, to form this “straightforward” 
image.  it is as if it is only by virtue of the possibility of the digital manipulation of a 
series of shots that on can get to the essence that Herzog & de Meuron were aiming 
at with their essay on the ordinary.  The building stands here in this image as 
ordinary, as unmediated, and immediate, and immediately present to us in its 
simplicity, only by means of a process extraordinary, intensely mediated, lacking in 
any form of presence, and complex; in short, only by means of an artificiality 










Likewise, Jeff Wall, in taking Hokusi’s “Gust of Wind” and recreating it as a more or 
less manipulated photographic image, complete with specially grown tree and 
presented to us via the medium of the light-box, is re-presenting an already highly 
stylised representation of nature in its raw state – the nature of the wind, those 
gusts against which Laugier’s savage would shelter himself.  But who can ay that 
the wind has been better understood, better given to us than by Hokusi’s image, if 
not by Wall’s recreation of it?  Was the wind ever such a wind before these works?  
Did the wind pre-exist the possibility of us representing it?  ie the possibility of us 




If it is perhaps difficult to answer yes or no to this, then I would argue still that we 
should remain attentive to the possibility, as least, that this opens.  The 
attentiveness would see in the difference between architecture and the site not the 
straightforward distinction between nature as pre-given, and architecture as the 
artificial imposition on it.  It would be attentive to the “zugleich”, to the “at the same 
time”, of architecture and the site – that is, the way in which the site in its beauty, 
its history, its harshness, its very existence, only comes to have this beauty, history, 
strength and being through architecture or through the possibility of something like 
architecture occurring.  This attentiveness would tend to eschew notions reliant on a 
temporality of before-and-after (closely allied with a cause-and-effect type of 
reasoning) in favour of a conceptualisation of the nature of the relationship between 
architecture and the site/architecture and nature , as a play, a sort of resonance 
between the two.  Place would be the resonance between the poles of artificiality 
and nature, what happens between these two.  Place-making, architecture, is not 
the placing of architectural works within the field of nature, but  rather the 
interaction and play between these two.  And crucially, this play would have no 
origin, no starting-point.  That is, we would not say that “naturally”, we start from 
“nature”.  There always already was the play occurring.  This is what Derrida refers 
is to in Plato’s Pharmacy, where he says that “there is no as such where play…. is 
concerned.  Having no essence, opening up the possibility of the double, the copy, 
the imitation, the simulacrum – the game… constantly disappears as it goes along”, 
and contrasts this strong notion of the game or movement prior to essence with 
Plato’s (successful) attempts to praise play “in the best sense of the word”, ie a play 
which is “supervised and contain within the safety net of politics and ethics”, ie a 




But this plays occurs not just between the poles of nature and architecture.  That 
other post-Heideggerian who speaks eloquently of architecture (and who died only 
last month) – Gadamer – evokes in Truth and Method the play between subject and 
object as the way in which art in general – and architecture in particular – exists; in 
contrast to the enlightenment notion of an aesthetic appreciation of works of art 
which leaves architecture almost fatally compromised.  In his “relational” 
interpretation, architecture is seen as the play between the building and those 
individuals and groups who inhabit it.  Neither subject nor object, architecture is the 
play between these two, giving them their possibility for existence.  It would no 
longer be adequate to say that, pre-existing the work of architecture, there is a 
certain need, or society, or “brief”, or “belief”, which the architecture embodies as a 
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representation, sign, or practical implementation of these things, coming after these 
pre-givens as a solution to a problem or the expression of a community or an 
individual.  Rather, these things are given their possibility by architecture (not the 
other way around); architecture resonates back onto them so that architecture gives 
us society; architecture breaks open the brief and redirects it into something new; 
architecture questions belief and gives us the possibility for others; architecture 
enables a community or an individual.  
 
Plato, for all his desire to cast the poets from the city, cannot escape this play, this 
game, which comes before his politics and ethics of control.  It is well know; 
Platonism posits the realm of truth as a realm of essential ideas, which pre-exist the 
knowledge we have of them.  This knowledge is by means of the “images” of these 
ideas; our sensory existence is one amongst mere secondary images of reality.  
Platonism’s structure is the same as the structural relationship between nature and 
architecture, traditionally thought.  Just as nature comes prior to the artificial; so the 
thing itself (as idea) comes before the image of it, as in a naïve view of photography 
or of figurative works of art.  Mountain first, Gursky’s photograph after.  Montparnas 
first; image second.  Essence first; image, mimesis, second.  The whole of reality is 
structured around this hierarchical duality which becomes the means by which the 






Except that Timaeus,  in recounting the nature of the world by means of this 
structure now so familiar to us, cannot actually achieve this explication.  As Derrida 
points out briefly in Plato’s Pharmacy, and at greater length in Chora, the point at 
which the exposition of the cosmos will no longer get along with the dualistic and 
hierarchical structuring of idea/image, essence/mimesis, origin/copy, nature/the 
artificial, is precisely at the place where chora has to be discussed.  For chora, the 
idea of “place”, is not and cannot be either idea/essence, or its polar opposite, 
mimesis/image.   Having set up this intellectual structure to describe the world, 
Plato/Timaeus finds that chora/place can only be perceived by means of a sort of 
“bastard” reasoning which does not remain respectful of these intellectual and 
political structures.  Chora, place, can only be thought about as if in a dream, 
perhaps because it slips out of and between any reasoning which would try to 
establish a starting point, an origin for it.  Chora gives place to the possibility of a 
game between essence and image, nature and image.  It is not ruled by these 
structures, but rather allows the possibility for them and for their movement. 
 
This movement is something like a dance.  The Greek work for chorus, similar to the 
work chora, refers of course not just to song but to the movement of the dance of 
the chorus across the Greek theatre.  Similarly, the German word for play, spiel, 
originates as dance.  Thus dance, play, and place would be intertwined and 
themselves self-resonant such that the notion of place giving place to movement 
would in turn be energised and given movement in a richer conceptualisation of 
architecture as already, inherently, inhabited by the dance.  We could say that the 
dance is what defines the space of architecture, but already we would not be 
remaining true to the subtlety of the intertwining of these two.  Rather, there is a 
dance too, without beginning, between the dance “itself” and its other in which it 
occurs, and which perhaps gives it its only possibility, namely architecture. 
 
Is it sure that dance, as spontaneous eruption of passion- the natural - is ruled and 
contained by architecture? Is it sure that the artificiality of architecture comes after 
nature?  Here, to end, are two works of pure artifice.  Each one is an image of the 
other, hung opposite the other, a reflection at play within the work. These works, by 
Robertson, are output using a photographic process onto a type of photographic 
paper; here, fixed onto a transparency and projected as a slide: an image, but one 
generated direct by digital manipulation, eschewing all reference back to the starting 
point of the “real” world.  My point is that these are no more artificial, no more 
abstract, nor less “natural” than the image with which we started.  This work needs 
no pre-existing “reality” or “idea” to justify it; rather, just like the Gursky with which 
we began, it gives us the possibility of the idea and the possibility of our reality. 
Robertson 
 
We should expect no less from architecture. 